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Cournot duopolyThis paper, which reexamines the Poyago-Theotokymodel, provides additional investigation thatwas conducted
under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new ﬁndings, we obtain the following. First, social
welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather
than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufﬁciently small, then the
equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy.Moreover, total emissions
under the emission subsidy scenario become less than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is
sufﬁciently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become
greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufﬁciently small, and if the R&D cost is high.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
In an industrialized economy in which giant ﬁrms dominate
markets, perpetual innovation drives the rate of growth in living
standards continuously. Particularly, it is true that the petroleum and
chemical industries have both been oligopolistic, routinizing corporate
and environmental innovations, and contributing to economic growth
with some environmental friendliness. These industries typically have
developed pollution abatement instruments such as desulfurization
equipment and denitriﬁcation equipment, which are categorized into
end-of-pipe technologies.
Emission regulation has received great amounts of attention from
many researchers. Studies of environmental regulation and emission-
reducing R&D in an oligopolistic market have been conducted by
Chiou and Hu (2001), Puller (2006), Riveiro (2008), Celik and Orbay
(2011), Yakita and Yamauchi (2011), Pal (2012), and others.
Particularly, Jaffe et al. (2002) and Requate (2005) provide excellent
surveys in that ﬁeld. The strategic behavior of polluting oligopolists
has a strong impact on social welfare. Therefore, it is highly necessary81 82 424 7212.
ida), dgoto@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
. Open access under CC BY license.for policy designers to accumulate the welfare performances and
implications of various environmental policy instruments in oligopo-
listic markets. In environmental policy studies, the timing of policy
variables is an important topic.
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) presents pioneering work on emission tax
policy and competition policy related to quantity-setting duopolists
with end-of-pipe technology. Particularly, that investigation examines
whether polluting Cournot duopolists' coordination of behavior in
environmental R&D is socially allowable or not when the government
has no precommitment capability with respect to emission taxes. The
study ﬁnds important policy implications for socially desirable R&D
formation under time-consistent emission taxes. Furthermore, Poyago-
Theotoky (2010) announces a corrigendum showing that the negative
emission tax (i.e., emission subsidy) might be partially justiﬁed if it
considerably improves the market inefﬁciency caused by Cournot
duopolists. Indeed, this is a surprising result, but the fundamental
question remains. That is “When does an emission subsidy reduce (or
increase) emissions?” The answer is fervently sought by policy designers.
Nevertheless, little attention has been devoted to that question.
In real society, many developed countries confront obligations related
to greenhouse gas reduction, alongwith international commitments such
as the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, most emerging countries seek both
industrialization and environmental improvement. Therefore, it is nec-
essary for social planners to investigate the regulatory circumstances
under which a time-consistent emission subsidy reduces (or increases)
emissions. On the other hand, in the existing literature on environmental
512 Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 36 (2014) 511–516regulation, negative emission taxes (emission subsidy) in oligopolistic
markets are discussed by Requate (1993a, 1993b), Petrakis and
Xepapadeas (1999, 2003), David (2005), Fujiwara (2009), Ben Youssef
and Dinar (2011), and others.1 Those studies point out that negative
emission tax rate can exist in equilibrium when environmental damage
is sufﬁciently small. However, investigations of negative emission taxes
are utterly inadequate. This paper carefully analyzes the emission-
reducing effects of negative emission taxes.
Arguments presented in this paper proceed as follows. Section 2
introduces the Poyago-Theotoky (2007) model and equilibrium out-
comes. Section 3 presents an examination of the sign of the equilibrium
emission tax rate and effects on total emissions. Section 4 presents policy
implications and conclusions.
2. Model and equilibrium outcomes
This section presents the model and its equilibrium outcomes.
2.1. The model
2.1.1. Market structure
Considering an industry comprising two homogeneous ﬁrms, ﬁrm i
and ﬁrm j, engaging in quantity competition with the same cost
structure and emissions-reducing technology, qi is assumed to denote
ﬁrm i's output. Inverse demand is given as p(qi,qj)=a− (qi+qj), (i, j=
1,2; i≠ j), where a(N0) is a market size parameter.
2.1.2. Environmental R&D and cost structure
The value of each ﬁrm's emissions per unit output is assumed to be
one. Firm i's environmental R&D effort is denoted as zi. Both ﬁrms use
end-of-pipe technology for pollution abatement. Although this abatement
technology is insufﬁcient to reduce emissions per unit output, it mitigates
emissions by adsorbing emissions at the end of the production process.
Firm i receives beneﬁts not only from its own environmental R&D
efforts but also from the efforts of its rival. When ﬁrm i's production
level is qi, then the R&D expenditures (γ/2)zi2, (γ N 0) enable ﬁrm i to
abate its emissions from qi to ei(qi,zi) ≡ qi− zi− βzj.2 A lower value of
γ implies higher efﬁciency of the environmental R&D cost. Symmetric
parameter β∈[0,1] denotes the spillover effects of R&D. Firm i's positive
externality from rival's R&D efforts is denoted as βzj. No ﬁxed costs for
pollution abatement are necessary. In addition, ﬁrm i's total cost
function is additively separable with respect to production costs and
R&D expenditures: C(qi,zi)= cqi+(γ/2)zi2, (cN0,A≡a− cN0).
2.1.3. Environmental damage and social welfare
Net emissions from ﬁrm i, ei(qi,zi), depend both on the output and on
environmental R&D efforts. Total emissions E ≡ ∑i = 12 ei(qi,zi) cause
environmental damage D(E) ≡ dE2/2, where d Nd ≡ −1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p 
=2
 
represents the damage parameter.3 Social welfare SW is deﬁned as the
sum of consumers' surplus and producer's surplus less environmental
damage D(E) and total R&D expenditures, as∑i=12 (γ/2)zi2.1 For studies of emission subsidies in the context of international trade, see Duval and
Hamilton (2002) and Straume (2006).
2 The emission function of end-of-pipe type is also employed by Ulph (1996), Poyago-
Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002), Straume (2006), Wang and Wang (2009), Kato
(2011), Pal (2012), and others. In contrast to them, the presentmodel explicitly addresses
the spillover effect of R&D. On the other hand, for an example of the emission function of
cleaner production type, see Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999), Chiou and Hu (2001), Puller
(2006), Ben Youssef and Dinar (2011), and others.
3 Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010) assumes d N 1/2, which is unnecessarily strict. An
interior solution for environmental R&D efforts is guaranteed by the following relaxed
assumption:dNd ≡ −1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p 
=2. In fact, two equilibrium values of R&D efforts in Table 1
(zN and zC) are both positive if dNd. For details, see Ouchida and Goto (2011).2.1.4. Timing
The regulator has no precommitment ability for emission tax rate t.
The time structure is the following:
Stage 1: Firm i determines zi to maximize its own proﬁt (πi) or joint
proﬁts (πi+πj).
Stage 2: The regulator determines emission tax rate (t) to maximize
social welfare.
Stage 3: Firm i determines output level (qi) noncooperatively to4 For detaile
5 Subscript “
environmenta
6 For details
[respectively, pmaximize its own proﬁt.2.2. Equilibrium outcomes
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) examines two environmental R&D
scenarios (R&D competition and R&D cartelization) and derives the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) under a time-consistent
emission tax.4
To begin, we explore the case of environmental R&D competition. In
stage 3, ﬁrm i's proﬁt is πi(qi,qj) = {a− (qi+ qj)}qi− cqi− t{qi− zi−
βzj} − (γ/2)zi2. Each ﬁrm chooses an output level noncooperatively
and simultaneously to maximize its own proﬁt. From the ﬁrst-order
conditions, the symmetric equilibrium output is calculated as q(t) =
(A− t)/3.
Consequently, social welfare in stage 2 is derived as SW(t) =
2Aq(t)− 2[q(t)]2− (d/2){2q(t)− (1+ β){zi+ zj}}2−∑i = 12 (γ/2)zi2.
The regulator determines the emission tax rate t to maximize social
welfare. From the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition, the subgame
equilibrium emission tax rate is yielded as
t zi; z j
 
¼
2d−1ð ÞA−3d 1þ βð Þ zi þ zj
n o
2 1þ dð Þ : ð1Þ
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm i's proﬁt is πi(zi,zj) = [q(t(zi,zj))]2 + t(zi,zj)
{zi+βzj}−(γ/2)zi2. Each ﬁrm determines its environmental R&D efforts
noncooperatively and simultaneously. From the ﬁrst-order conditions
∂πi(zi,zj)/∂zi=0,(i, j=1,2; i≠ j), we obtain the equilibrium R&D efforts
zN and the equilibrium values of other variables. The results are
presented in Table 1.5
Environmental R&D cartelization implies that each ﬁrm determines
its environmental R&D effort collusively to maximize joint proﬁts
(πi(zi,zj)+πj(zi,zj)) during the ﬁrst stage. Each equilibrium value under
R&D cartelization is also reported in Table 1.
3. Investigations and results
This section presents examination of the sign of the equilibrium
emission tax rate and effects on total emissions.
3.1. Sign of emission tax rate
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) proves that each ﬁrm always has some
incentive for R&D cooperation, that is πC≥πN, and that SWCN SWN if 1/
2 b d b 3/2.6 Furthermore, that research shows that social welfare
under environmental R&D cartelization is higher than the case of
noncooperative environmental R&D, except in the case of large damage
and lower R&D cost. The exceptional case is presented as Region IV in
Fig. 1. In Region IV, SWC b SWN. On the other hand, in Regions I, II, andd solution procedures, see Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010).
N” stands for the case of R&D competition. Subscript “C” denotes the case of
l R&D cartelization.
, see Equation (16) and Part (i) of Proposition 2 in Poyago-Theotoky (2007)
.70 and p.72].
Table 1
Equilibrium outcomes under two environmental R&D scenarios.
Two environmental R&D scenarios
Environmental R&D competition Environmental R&D cartelization
Environmental R&D efforts zN ¼ 1þdð Þ 2d−1ð Þþd 1þβð Þ½ A2γ 1þdð Þ2þd 1þβð Þ 3 3þβð Þþd 7þβð Þ½  zC ¼
1þβð Þ 1þdð Þ 2d−1ð Þþ2d½ A
2γ 1þdð Þ2þ4d 3þ2dð Þ 1þβð Þ2
Emission tax rate tN ¼
d 2d−3ð Þ 1þβð Þ2þ2γ 2d2þd−1ð Þ½ A
4γ 1þdð Þ2þ2d 1þβð Þ 3 3þβð Þþd 7þβð Þ½  tC ¼
d 2d−3ð Þ 1þβð Þ2þγ 2d2þd−1ð Þ½ A
2γ 1þdð Þ2þ4d 3þ2dð Þ 1þβð Þ2
Output level qN ¼
2 1þdð Þγþd 1þβð Þ 7þ4dþ3βð Þ½ A
4γ 1þdð Þ2þ2d 1þβð Þ 3 3þβð Þþd 7þβð Þ½  qC ¼
d 5þ2dð Þ 1þβð Þ2þγ 1þdð Þ½ A
2γ 1þdð Þ2þ4d 3þ2dð Þ 1þβð Þ2
Emissions eN ¼ 2 1þdð Þγþ 1þβð Þ 3þβð Þdþ2f g½ A4γ 1þdð Þ2þ2d 1þβð Þ 3 3þβð Þþd 7þβð Þ½  eC ¼
1þdð Þγþ 2dþ1ð Þ 1þβð Þ2½ A
2γ 1þdð Þ2þ4d 3þ2dð Þ 1þβð Þ2
Proﬁts πN= qN2 + tN(1+β)zN− (γ/2)zN2 πC= qC2+ tC(1+β)zC− (γ/2)zC2
Social welfare SWN=2AqN− 2qN2 − 2d{qN− (1+β)zN}2−γzN2 SWC=2AqC− 2qC2− 2d{qC− (1+β)zC}2−γzC2
513Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 36 (2014) 511–516III in Fig. 1, SWCNSWN. Precisely speaking, if d≥3/2, then SWC≥(b)SWN
for all γ≥ (b)γφ.7
However, strictly speaking, as pointed out by Ouchida and Goto
(2011), those results still hold under relaxed assumptions: dNd ≡
−1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p 
=2. Therefore, if dbdb3=2, then cooperative environmental
R&D is always socially allowable, which implies that the government
permits ﬁrms to undertake R&D cooperation at stage 1, and also
determines the emission tax rate tC during stage 2 ifdbdb3=2. In addition,
from Table 1, it is readily apparent that tCN0 and tNN0 if d≥3/2.
Poyago-Theotoky (2010) points out that the emission tax rate in
SPNE can be negative.8 The sign of the denominator of tC in Table 1 is
positive. Therefore, we speciﬁcally examine the sign of the numerator.
The sign of tC depends on the following condition.
tC b ≥ð Þ 0⇔γ b ≥ð Þ γtC ≡
d 3−2dð Þ 1þ βð Þ2
2d−1ð Þ dþ 1ð Þ ð2Þ
The critical value γCt is presented in Fig. 1.9 The asymptotic line of γCt is
d=1/2. If d is in the interval d;1=2ð , then tCb0 for allγN0 andβ∈[0,1]. In
Regions I and II in Fig. 1, tCb0. In contrast, in Regions III and IV, tCN0.When
d N 3/2, then tC N 0 for all γ N 0 and β∈ [0,1]. Proposition 1 summarizes
these results for the sign of tC.
Proposition 1.
(i) When d b d ≤ 1=2, then tCb0 for all γN0 and β∈ [0,1].
(ii) When 1/2b d≤3/2, then tCb0 for all γbγCt .
(iii) When 1/2b d≤3/2, then tC≥0 for all γ≥γCt .
In this model, a negative emission tax rate (i.e., emission subsidy) is
fundamentally equivalent to the policymix of a production subsidy and
an abatement tax because each ﬁrm's emission function is assumed as
pollution generated by productionminus net abatements. A production
subsidy has two effects. One is a damage-increasing effect. The other is
the decreasing effect of market inefﬁciency. When d is sufﬁciently
small, the increasing effect of environmental damage is dominated by7 The critical value γφ is deﬁned as γφ ≡ {γ N 0| φ ≡ d(3 − 2d)(1 + β)2(1 − β) +
2γ(2d2 β+ 2d β− β+ d) = 0, d N 3/2}. The deﬁnition of φ is given in Poyago-Theotoky
(2007, p. 69). The critical valueγφ is presented in Figure 1.Whenβ=1, Region IV disappears.
8 Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) analyze the strategic emission tax policy when the
monopolist can relocate abroad. Then, they point out that time-consistent emission tax
rate in SPNE can be negative.
9 The critical value γCt is a monotonically decreasing function in d ∈ (1/2, 3/2). In
addition, the critical value γφ is a monotonically increasing function in d ∈ (3/2, + ∞).
Consequently, it seems that those two curves in Fig. 1 apparently have the unique
intersection at (d,γ)= (3/2, 0).the improvement effect on market inefﬁciency. This is the economic
intuition underlying the negative emission tax rate.10 Particularly, part
(i) of Proposition 1 is newly obtained under the parameter range
corrected by Ouchida and Goto (2011), whereas Poyago-Theotoky
(2010) points out the existence of a negative emission tax in the case of
part (ii) of Proposition 1.
As shownbyRequate (1993a, 1993b), Petrakis andXepapadeas (1999,
2003), Fujiwara (2009), Ben Youssef and Dinar (2011), and others, a
negative emission tax can be justiﬁed socially when environmental
damage is sufﬁciently slight.11 The Poyago-Theotoky (2007) model is
relatedwith these studies, and is also somewhat different in the following
four points: timing of emission taxation,market structure, spillover effect,
and the type of emission function. Despite such differences, Proposition 1
of the present paper and Poyago-Theotoky (2010) show that a negative
emission tax is realized in equilibrium when environmental damage is
sufﬁciently small. This fact suggests that the necessary condition for
negative emission tax is still robust in the case of a time-consistent
emission tax policy toward Cournot duopolists.
3.2. Negative emission tax and total emissions
Next we calculate the effect of the time-consistent emission tax on
the reduction of total emissions. The equilibrium emission per ﬁrm
under laissez-faire is A/3. Therefore, total emissions under laissez-faire
are E0 ≡ 2A/3. Total emissions under environmental R&D cartelization
are EC ≡ 2eC. After some manipulation, the difference between E0 and
EC is obtained as presented below.
E0−EC≥ bð Þ0⇔γ≤ Nð Þ γE ≡
1þ βð Þ2 −8d2−6dþ 3
n o
2d−1ð Þ dþ 1ð Þ ð3Þ
Therefore, the effect of time-consistent emission tax (or emission
subsidy) on the reduction of total emissions is summarized in the
following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 2.
(i) When d b d b 1=2, then ECN E0 for all γNγE.
(ii) When d b d b 1=2, then EC≤E0 for all γ≤γE.
(iii) When d≥1/2, then EC b E0 for all γ and β ∈ [0,1].
(iv) When γ b
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
−1
 
1þ βð Þ2, then EC b E0 for all d∈ d;þ∞ð Þ.10 For details, see Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003, p.203) and Poyago-Theotoky (2010).
11 Fujiwara's (2009) model does not incorporate ﬁrms' investment in pollution
abatement.
(i) β = 0.00 (ii) β = 0.3
(iii) β = 0.6 (iv) β = 1.0
Fig. 1. Sign of the emission tax rate and total emissions.
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Corollary 1. When γb
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
−1
 
, then EC b E0 for all d∈ d;þ∞ð Þ and
β∈ [0,1].
(Proof). Readily inferred from Proposition 2 (iv). □
In Fig. 1, γE is described as the borderline between Region I and
Region II. In both Regions I and II, the sign of the equilibrium emission
tax rate is negative: the emission subsidy is realized in the equilibrium.
Therefore, we can identify that in Region I, the emission subsidy yields
greater total emissions than those under laissez-faire. In Region II, how-
ever, it yields less total emissions than those under laissez-faire, i.e., theemission subsidy reduces total emissions. Among reports of existing
studies of the literature, except for this research, no study has ever
explicitly examined emission-reducing and emission-increasing effects
under emission subsidy.
We now explore the intuition underlying the existence of Regions I
and II. As environmental damage d decreases, the equilibrium emission
tax rate tC, R&D effort zC, and accordingly R&D effort with a spillover
effect (1 + β)zC respectively denote decreases. Additionally, as the
R&D cost parameter γ becomes large, each value of zC and (1 + β)zC
decreases greatly. Ultimately, if the value of d is sufﬁciently small,
then the sign of tC becomes negative. However, as the value of d
becomes small, the equilibrium production level per ﬁrm qC becomes
greater. Consequently, as shown by Region I, total emissions under
Table 2
Emission tax rate, total emissions and social welfare.
Region Emission tax Total emissions Social welfare
I tC b 0 EC N E0 SWC N SWN
II tC b 0 EC b E0 SWC N SWN
III tC N 0 EC b E0 SWC N SWN
IV tN N 0 EN b E0 SWC b SWN
515Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 36 (2014) 511–516emission subsidies become greater than that under laissez-faire if the
damage parameter is sufﬁciently small, and if R&D cost is not low. In
Region II, although the sign of equilibrium emission tax rate is negative,
total emissions under an emission subsidy become smaller than the case
of laissez-faire because the emission-increasing effect is dominated by
the large abatement effect.12
From the deﬁnitions of γCt and γE in Eqs. (2) and (3), we obtain the
following proposition with respect to Region II.
Proposition 3. The greater the spillover effect becomes, the broader
the regulatory circumstances in which emission subsidies reduce total
emissions.
(Proof). See Appendix B. □
Proposition 3 states that Region II is increasing in β. Fig. 1 presents
this result graphically. The value of β can be regarded as the level of
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Therefore, a stronger IPR
protection level generates smaller Region II. When the spillover is
perfect (β=1), Region I becomes the smallest.
Next, we devote attention to the case of d N 3/2. Then, it is
straightforward to verify that tC N 0, tN N 0, EC b E0, and EN ≡ 2eN b E0 if
d N 3/2. Furthermore, because social welfare under laissez-faire is
calculated as SW0≡2(2−d)A2/9,we obtain that SWCNSW0 and SWNNSW0
for alld∈ d;þ∞ð Þ, γN0 and β∈[0,1]. These results for social welfare imply
that a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is invariably
welfare-enhancing. From our examinations described above and con-
clusions reported by Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010), a comparison of
results with regard to the sign of emission tax rate, total emissions, and
social welfare is presented in Table 2.14 Kamien et al. (1992, p.1295) provide a deﬁnition of four R&D scenarios: R&D
competition, R&D cartelization, RJV competition, and RJV cartelization. According to that
deﬁnition, RJV is regarded as the case of perfect spillover (i.e., β=1).4. Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this section, we derive two policy implications from our analysis
explained above: one is derived frompart (i) of Proposition 2 (i.e., Region
I in Fig. 1); the other is derived from part (ii) of Proposition 2 (i.e., Region
II). The latter is more meaningful. The petroleum reﬁning industry and
the petrochemical industry are examples of polluting industries using
desulfurization equipment and denitriﬁcation equipment. Those indus-
tries, which are directly applicable to this model, emit plenty of green-
house gasses. This study provides fundamental results that are
expected to be useful in avoiding policy failure when the regulator's
policy variable is a time-consistent emission tax.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 implies that if the environmental damage
parameter is sufﬁciently small, and if R&D cost parameter is sufﬁciently
high, then the government will choose a time-consistent emission
subsidy that yields “greater emissions” than those under laissez-faire
in Cournot duopoly. Now, let us assume that the government faces the
obligation of emission reduction. In this case, a policy contradiction is
unavoidable. In reality, governments of the developed countries
committed to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The regulator of
those countries should investigate the real value of R&D spillover.
On the other hand, part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that if the
environmental damage parameter is sufﬁciently small, then the
government will choose a time-consistent emission subsidy that yields
“less emissions” than those under laissez-faire in Cournot duopoly. That
is to say, an emission subsidy can reduce the total emissions.13 Previous
studies have devoted little attention to such circumstances (i.e., Region II).12 Unlike Region IV, Regions I and II still exist even if β=1.
13 Whereas David (2005, p.518) points out that emission subsidy is unrealistic and
unacceptable, an emission subsidy in the present model is the result of policy tradeoff of
output subsidy and abatement tax.In the Poyago-Theotoky model using the emission function of end-of-
pipe type, a positive emission tax rate is equivalent to the policy
combination of output tax and abatement subsidy. This characteristic
sends an important message for economic analysis of emission tax policy
in an oligopolistic market. The effect of an emissions tax on total emis-
sions can be resolved into the effect on outputs and the effect on
abatements. In addition, existing literatures on environmental policy
have tended to examine, speciﬁcally, the circumstances where environ-
mental damage is not slight. However, if the value of damage parameter
is sufﬁciently small, then the sign of equilibrium emission tax rate
can be negative. As pointed out by Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003),
Fujiwara (2009), and Poyago-Theotoky (2010), negative emission taxes
(emission subsidy) can be partially justiﬁed if the market power
mitigation effect yielded by emission subsidy dominates the damage-
increasing effect. Based on those, further examinations under a wider
damageparameter range (i.e.,dNd) newlyprove the existence of Region II.
This research provides new insights on policy-making. From the
social welfare ranking in Table 2, environmental R&D cartelization is
socially desirable in Region I. Furthermore, Proposition 3 implies that
the perfect spillover minimizes Region I. These results show that
environmental research joint venture (RJV) cartelization shrinks the
regulatory environment of the emission-increasing outcome.14 As the
most important contributions of this paper, our investigation illustrates
the circumstances in which negative emission tax rate occurs. At the
same time, we explicitly show the circumstances in which negative
emission tax (emission subsidy) reduces total emissions. Furthermore,
this research reveals that emission subsidy under environmental R&D
cartelization improves the level of social welfare.15
As described in this paper, our new ﬁndings present two points of
particular signiﬁcance.16 One is derivation of incremental policy
implications. Another is to give a further theoretical foundation for
time-consistent emission tax policy in quantity-setting duopoly. This
research plays an indispensable complementary role for contributions
by Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010).Acknowledgments
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bdb3=2 . However, this research does not address the scenario of environmental RJV
cartelization.
16 We cannot obtain the new ﬁndings if we adopt the unnecessarily strict assumption for
the environmental damage parameter by Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010) that is d N 1/2.
Our results are generated by further investigations under the corrected damage parameter.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The difference between E0=2A/3 and EC=2eC
is calculated as shown below.
E0−EC ≥ bð Þ0⇔γ ≤ Nð ÞγE ≡
1þ βð Þ2 −8d2−6dþ 3
n o
2d−1ð Þ dþ 1ð Þ
The critical value γE is the increasing function in the interval d;1=2ð Þ.
In addition, γEN0 for alld∈ d;1=2ð Þ. Consequently, the value of γE at the
γ-intercept is obtained asγEjd¼d ¼
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
−1

1þ βð Þ2. The value ofγEjd¼d
is increasing in β∈[0,1]. Furthermore, the asymptotic line of γE is d=1/
2. If d≥1/2, then E0−ECN0.□
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3. From Eq. (2), we have, straightforwardly,
∂γCt /∂β N 0 for all d ∈ (1/2, 3/2), γ N 0, and β ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, from
Eq. (3), ∂γE/∂β N 0 for all d∈ d;1=2ð Þ , γ N 0, and β ∈ [0,1]. Therefore,
Region II becomes larger as β becomes larger. □
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